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CoiDinunity Policing in Seattle:
A Model Partnership Between
Citizens and Police
When citizens and police in South Seattle
banded together to fight crime, quarterly
crime statistics showed dramatic improvements in the quality of life. Citizen activity
spread in the city's other three police precincts; now community policing is a going
concern throughout Seattle-a citywide
success.
The story of this success shows what can
happen when citizens work in partnership
with the police to prevent crime and create
safer neighborhoods.

Community policing
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has
been a leader since the mid-seventies in the
development and implementation of what
is now called community policing.

NIJ's early research on comprehensive
crime prevention programs focused on
policing, community involvement, and
environmental security strategies as
exemplified in Hartford's Crime Control
Program.
"Fear of crime" studies in Houston and
Newark confirmed that community conditions, the "Broken Windows" of which
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling
wrote, 1 help to define crime's interaction
with community life. Also, "problemoriented policing" studies in Norfolk demonstrated how police, as individuals and as
an institution, can assume an innovative
and participatory role in community life.
As part of its efforts to increase information about community policing, NIJ
granted funding in 1988 for the Seattle

Police Department to conduct a descriptive
research project on the South Seattle crime
prevention efforts that led to community
policing in the city.

A city's postwar changes
South of downtown Seattle and the city's
racially mixed Central Area lies Rainier
Valley (see figure 1). Businesses along its
main thoroughfares, Rainier Avenue and
Martin Luther King Way, focus on lower
middle-class and working-class needs. (To
the west is a heavily industrial area and,
further still, West Seattle-geographically
separated from the rest of the city and
reached by bridges and causeways.)
Rainier Valley once resembled the rest of
Seattle: prosperous, progressive, demographically two-thirds white with fair-sized

From the Director
The outlines of a new direction for police,
known as "community policing," emerged
in the 1980's in response to a rising tide of
crime in the 1960's and 1970's. The approach affirms the importance of police
and citizens working together to control
crime and maintain order.
NIJ has been conducting research in community policing for more than a decade and
a half. Early field experiments tested
various police-citizen partnerships and
ways in which foot patrol, door-to-door
contact, and other positive contact between
police and citizens could reduce the fear of
crime and improve neighborhood life.
Later, the Institute explored various facets
of the problem-oriented approach to con-

-

----.-,......

.

1111
. :::. '--: '~

..

trolling crime, particularly drug trafficking.
This approach calls on police to exercise both
initiative in identifying the source of problems
and imaginativeness in enlisting community
help in developing solutions.
NIJ is currently engaged in a comprehensive
program of research, technical assistance, and
training to encourage innovations in community policing and police-citizen partnerships to
combat crime and drugs. The Institute is also
evaluating neighborhood policing projects
funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance.
We believe in community policing's potential
for better, smarter law enforcement. This
Research in Brief on South Seattle' s policecitizen partnership is the first in a series of new
NIJ publications on community policing in
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urban areas. Other publications are planned
on projects in Madison, Wisconsin, and
Houston, Texas.
We also know that citizens have a stake in
their neighborhoods and, when given a
chance, will work hard with police to take
back their streets from drug traffickers and
other criminal elements. In South Seattle
that is exactly what citizens and police did,
working together. By putting their story on
these pages, NIJ encourages citizens and
public servants in other communities to
take heart and do likewise.

Charles B. DeWitt
Director
National Institute of Justice

Figure 1

City of Seattle
Seattle is located on a peninsula in Puget Sound. The shaded area is the Southeast, loosely
referred to as Rainier Valley, where formation and activities of the South Seattle Crime
Prevention Council began in 1987.

African-American and Asian minorities
and smaller groups of Hispanics and Native Americans. After World War II, two
large new public housing projects and an
influx of African Americans from the
Central Area increased the proportion of
low-income minorities. 2
However, the Southeast failed to keep pace
economically. New construction declined.
The crime rate rose.
Confident of their long-standing political
clout, community activists met in the
1970's with city and county officials,
including the county prosecutor, to express
their concern over what they perceived to
be a crime wave. Their Court Watch program helped defeat two judges perceived
as lax on offenders. Furthermore, a precinct police commander promoted team
policing and community involvement, a
proposal that won much citizen support.
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In 1979, the mayor established the Economic Renewal Task Force of Rainier
Valley. This was preceded by a Block
Watch program to cut the rate of residential burglary; the Nation's first Business
Watch program to tackle commercial
burglaries; and the Crime Prevention
League to serve as the southeast Seattle
business community's private crime fighting agency.

Narcotics and street crime
Then crack cocaine came to Rainier
Valley.
Paralleling developments in the rest of the
city, State, and Nation, cocaine use spread
in minority areas, especially the housing
developments. The city's narcotics violations rose from 582 in 1983 to 4,850 in
1989. Police discovered fortified homes
dealing cocaine, and street gangs infested
parks, parking lots, and other public areas.
Calls for service started to climb in 1984
(see figure 2).
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SSCPC Target Area

Community organizations and police tried
tough new tactics. A black activist whose
father was a police officer became security
officer for the housing projects and gave
police information they needed to get
search warrants. The Rainier Chamber of
Commerce also launched a cleanup and
antigraffiti drive.
For its part, the Seattle Police Department
set up a precinct Anticrime Team (ACT)
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Figure2

Calls for Service
Seattle Police Precincts: 1982-1989
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Call!i for service1 rose sharply throughout Sea LUe from I984 onwards. While they declined sllghtly beginning in 1988 for other parts of the
city, in the south they continued to rise. T his trend may reflect a rise in public a war ness of police services following the formation of
SSCPC. See tigure 3 for a p icture of crime trends during the same period.)
1

This includes all on-views/calls for service.
Citywide total CFS 1989 = 429,960.
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comprising a sergeant, a detective, and two
uniformed officers-not to make arrests
but to disrupt or destroy drug operations.
Although the team's efforts drew wide
community support, a department review
of its tactics led to a restructuring of the
ACT operation.
The department directed the new Anticrime
Team to adhere strictly to established
departmental procedures, with more emphasis placed on making arrests. Yet even
though the new ACT squad made 422

arrests in 2 months, the increasingly involved community voiced continued support for the original ACT procedures.
Furthermore, the commercial burglary rate
continued to rise.

Raising a new
community voice
At an informal gathering at the Rainier
Chamber of Commerce in the spring of
1987, some citizens questioned the motiva-
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tion of patrol officers in the South Precinct.
While the immediate concern was the
rising commercial burglary rate, an ultimate concern was the economic and social
future of the Southeast. Many of those at
the meeting had businesses there; most still
lived there.
The editor and publisher of the South District Journal had called the meeting. He
had close ties with Chamber of Commerce
members and with police officials both in
the South Precinct and throughout the city.

The police precinct commander, who
frequently attended subsequent meetings,
convinced the businessmen and women
that the commercial burglaries were tied to
the prevalence of crack houses and drug
use. The business leaders then met with the
mayor to propose a program that included:
• A community review committee to set
priorities for reducing crime.
• Greater productivity and better communication within the police department and
other city departments.
• A proactive, not reactive, police
response to citizen concerns.
• Standards of achievement for police
from the chief on down.
• Reporting procedures to assure citizens
the police were making progress.
The mayor expressed faith in the police
chief who, in tum, encouraged police supervisors to meet frequently with the citizen group. At those meetings, the police
stressed the legal, administrative, and budgetary restraints they faced. Although discouraged by this, the community group
considered its previous years of cooperation with the police and decided the community itself would have to supply the
"vision and imagination" to solve its
problems.
The police, for their part, discovered they
faced not a group of mere complainers,
looking for quick fixes, but people seeking
broad-based, long-term solutions to the
problem of crime. Rather than using information supplied by the police to attack the
police, the citizen group lobbied before the
city council and legislature for more police
funds and powers.
In September 1987, the Rainier Chamber
of Commerce submitted a plan to the
mayor that proposed:
• Increasing South Precinct staff by 15
sworn officers and several civilians.
• Creating a Community Advisory Committee "to develop the program" and its
guidelines.
• Obtaining "total support" from the chief
of police, the mayor, and the advisory
committee for the precinct commander,
who would head the program.

• Giving special training for precinct personnel "to provide liaison between the
community, the [advisory] committee, and
the South Precinct."
• Providing special community support
"if the [Police] Department has insufficient
funds."
Although police department negotiators
were unable to promise additional resources for the South Precinct without
disrupting citywide patterns, they did point
out ways of stretching available precinct
resources.
Community negotiators felt the word "advisory" meant "partnership," that the community truly would exercise a strong voice
in selecting police targets and goals. Police
felt they had the legal power to run their
own operations. Still, they were aware that
the Chamber had the power to take its case
to the press.
Neither side overplayed its hand. The
advisory committee's powers remained
ambiguous, but a pattern of cooperation
developed. In testimony before the city
council, the police chief praised the
community's intervention into their social
problems.

Crime prevention
group reborn
In January of 1988, the Chamber resurrected the corporate shell of the defunct
Crime Prevention League (a private crime
fighting agency formed in 1984 that had
since faded because of a lack of funds) and
changed its name to the South Seattle
Crime Prevention Council (SSCPC).
This became a self-perpetuating assemblage of community organizations, not an
open membership association. The lightly
publicized regular meetings were attended
only by approximately 17 members
(whose attendance record ran about 80
percent) and a few invited guests. Either
the precinct captain or one of his lieutenants attended as a full participating
member.
The police "members," high ranking as
they usually were, talked as frankly as the
civilians. They freely discussed police
plans and tactics that, in a group considered less "a part of the team," would have
been considered strictly confidential.
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Choosing police targets
SSCPC discussed targeting of crime problems at an early meeting, 2 weeks before
its activity became official, but adjourned
for lack of a quorum. The clear implication
was that when a quorum was present, this
community organization, despite having no
formal government status, could decide
where police would concentrate their
efforts.
A truly radical departure in American
policing was now under way. At subsequent weekly meetings, with police command staff present, targets were selected,
added, or classified as "pending" or "resolved"-all by formal parliamentary
motion.
The chosen targets were, for the most part,
those the police determined were the principal hot spots in the Southeast. The community agreed. The issue of "power" or
"control" as opposed to "advice" did not
yet arise because there was no controversy
over the action itself.
With the dominant initiative in selection
coming from the police, police targets
could be specific locations and offenses or
more general problems, such as abandoned
cars. The precinct captain's biggest concern over abandoned cars was their use for
drug dealing. The citizens were more concerned with appearances in the neighborhood. Yet even before the citizen concern
had been made known, SSCPC went along
with the captain's suggestion.

Dealing with targets
Police action consisted of aggressive
patrol with special attention to the targets.
Officers were expected to visit these at
least twice each shift, fully documenting
the visits in special log entries.
In addition, police reviewed crack house
reports from the community hotline. Confinned reports were added to the target list.
By the end of the first year, police were
working on 39 targets, successfully "completing" nearly half. By the end of the
following year, the other half had been
taken care of. Twenty crack houses were
included in the initial 39 targets, and most
were closed within the first year. Yet police and community had to persist in efforts to drive crack houses permanently out

Jf an area since these tended to move from
place to place.
At SSCPC meetings, police reported in
detail on criminal or disorderly behavior at
the targets. Citizen representatives reported, too-on how citizens, no longer
afraid of being accosted by drug dealers at
bus stops, began to use public transportation again and how graffiti or prostitution
declined in a given area.
The targeting procedure reaped other benefits as well. It gave the police a chance to
interact with the community around specific public safety issues. This went beyond "public relations." Citizen.s learned
how the criminal justice response to crime
works (or doesn't work). For example,
when arrested drug dealers showed up on
the streets again, people realized that arrests alone did not assure public safety; the
rest of the criminal justice system had to
follow through.
Targeting also broadened the police's
outlook. When the community put pressure
on landlords who were not cooperating in
the civil abatement process to evict tenants
who deal in drugs, the connection between
a community's pressure and a suddenly
cooperative landlord was soon clear to the
police.
Thus encouraged by the community's help,
the police viewed their work differently
from before. The target selection process
directed their attention away from mere
response to individual calls toward broader
responsibility for dealing with community
issues.
Despite a few administrative problems,
including some dissatisfaction with a lack
of patrol officer input into the target selection, the procedure was successful in either
displacing or ending illegal activity at the
targets.

Programs aid crime control
Concerns were wide ranging and led to the
development of several key programs and
strategies. These included the following:
Narcotics activity reports (NAR's).
Citizen complaints of drug activity were
received by phone or in person, at the
station, on the beat, or through the community hotline. Each NAR was forwarded to

Police had an active presence in many neighborhoods, including several housing projects where
resident managers were concerned about drug-related crime. Officer Marsha Wilson talks with the
manager of Martin Luther King Apartments.

the Narcotics Division, which assigned it
for followup investigation by patrol, the
Anticrime Team (ACT), the narcotics
street team, or narcotics detectives. Usually
a precinct officer in the area of narcotics
activity did a followup investigation to
substantiate the activity. If further action
was required, the officer notified ACT, the
narcotics street team, or other detectives. If
the activity was not substantiated, an officer or sergeant contacted the complainant
to report this fact. Police followed up I ,219
such reports in one year.
Criminal trespass program. Property
owners gave police advance permission to
enter private property such as parking lots
or exterior stairs to investigate and potentially arrest loiterers. Police could cite or
arrest individuals who might have been
loitering to do drug transactions, even
though the transactions were not taking
place at the time. The trespass program
required a first warning (either in person or
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through posted signs) that trespassing was
illegal and that violators would be cited.
More than 100 businesses signed up, and
1,044 persons received citations.
Pay telephone program. Standard pay
phones were put on a "call out only" status. Once the phones could not receive
incoming calls, drug dealers could no
longer use them to receive messages. During 1988, 13 phones were put on "call out
only" status.
Owner notification (drug trafficking
civil abatement program). This program
gave property owners quick notice that
their tenants faced legal action for using
their property for drug-involved purposes.
Originally started by the police department
as a mere warning that illegal activity was
being carried out on an owner's premises,
the program became part of the city's
implementation of the State's 1988
Abatement Law.

Two warnings are given to the owner of a
property where narcotics activity has been
observed and documented through search
warrants. If the problem is not corrected
after the second search warrant, a final
abatement notice is mailed and abatement
proceedings are initiated. The large majority of owners (90 percent) have been responsive, and only a small number of
premises actually go through the entire
abatement process.
A landlord education component was
incorporated into the abatement program.
SSCPC sponsors a series of training sessions for apartment owners and managers
on how to keep their property drug free.
SSCPC's strong link to the real estate
community, heretofore seeh as an obstacle
to building a broader base in the community, turned out to be an asset in this .case.
SSCPC could reach into the network of
apartment owners and operators to encourage them to attend the workshops. SSCPC
representatives and the South Precinct
captain showed the landlords how they
could legally screen renters for previous
drug involvement, require that tenants keep
the apartment drug free, and obtain police
assistance during evictions.

Antigraffiti program. "Paintouts" were a
popular activity for anticrime volunteers.
Launched by the Rainier Chamber of
Commerce, the program gained the support of both the police and SSCPC, which
promotes the progrrup in its information
packet. Some police officers have participated in the paintouts in addition to looking for and citing people making graffiti.
In 1989, Seattle's engineering department
received funding for an antigraffiti coordinator as well as paint for the program. In
addition, the city ' s Summer Youth Employment program (a supervisor and seven
staff) joined the effort, and a graffiti hotline was established, with calls relayed to
the engineering department coordinator for
followup.
Telephone hotline. This is basically an
anonymous tipline. However, callers were
urged to use it for any public service problems that were not "911 emergencies." If
they wanted to sacrifice anonymity in
order to learn the results of a call, they
could leave a phone number or address.
Much to the surprise of SSCPC and some
of the police, 40 percent of the calls con-

cemed abandoned cars. Police arranged for
the removal of so many cars that the towing company temporarily ran out of space
to store them. As the abandoned cars began disappearing from the streets, citizen
calls shifted to calls about drugs, especially
crack houses.
At first volunteers manned the hotline, but
later an answering machine that had been
put into use for after-hours calls was used
for all calls. The recorded hotline greeting,
originally very brief to conserve storage
capacity, was expanded for more effective
police followup. The expanded greeting
encouraged callers to supply details needed
about the address, date, and time of the
incident.

Garden police car program. A twoofficer police car was dedicated to work in
two housing projects located in the South
Precinct area. The officers, who were not
responsible for responding to any but
extreme emergency radio calls, used conventional neighborhood-oriented police
tactics, even though the layout of the
projects did not encourage a walking beat.
They checked on drug activity and made
arrests when needed. Usually the same two
officers were assigned to the car, and the
residents grew to feel they "owned" the
garden car.

Gaining broader participation
Heightened police presence and activity
eventually led to broad community support for the SSCPC-police partnership.
Although dominated from the start by
members of the powerful, politically sophisticated, mainly white Rainier Chamber
of Commerce, SSCPC acknowledged its
responsibility to extend its activity and
power to the broader community.
Early efforts were not promising. When
SSCPC delegated two white members to
seek out additional black representation,
they discovered that membership in black
organizations and churches tended not to
be geographically based and that few were
located in the South Precinct (most were in
the Central Area to the north).
In mid-1989, however, a large middleclass neighborhood group met at the South
Precinct station to express its anger over a
rash of burglaries. SSCPC sent representatives, though few from the aggrieved
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neighborhood had ever heard of SSCPC.
At a followup meeting, an SSCPC member
took one of the incensed protestors aside to
compare notes, converting him instantly to
an SSCPC activist.
Transferring its efforts less from race to
race than from neighborhood to neighborhood, SSCPC gradually spread its umbrella. Neighborhood leaders seeking
empowerment and self-respect found they
could quickly tie their own anticrime crusades to the larger effort of SSCPC.
Spreading its geographic influence gave
SSCPC the ethnic diversity it sought.

Police liaison broadens
A different lack of diversity appeared in
the original arrangement in which the
citizen group, arguably a somewhat elite
one, communicated mainly with precinct
command-level police officials: the precinct captain, occasionally a lieutenant, but
only rarely a sergeant, much less a patrol
officer.
The police department's Crime Prevention
Division, staffed mainly by civilian employees rather than sworn officers, was
responsible for such activities as Neighborhood Block Watch and Business Watch.
But the division had little rapport with the
Rainier Chamber of Commerce and received public criticism from the Chamber.
Only after the Crime Prevention Division
was reorganized in 1989 did relations
improve. The Crime Prevention Division
began to assign Block Watch organizers
permanently. Before then, once Block
Watch was established in a neighborhood,
the organizers were reassigned to other
neighborhoods.
Relations between SSCPC and the Crime
Prevention Division now became more
positive. Even the crime prevention organizers began to stop into the South Precinct
station more frequently .

Involving other city agencies
Inevitably, other public agencies were
affected by the SSCPC-police partnership.
The Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) had
already developed a tough policy of evicting tenants found with drugs and worked
in close cooperation with the police. The
second-ranking SHA official participated

l SSCPC meetings. Although at first SHA
did not feel participation in SSCPC needed
to extend to the housing projects' onsite
managers, pressure and encouragement
from SSCPC led to SHA's advocacy of
increased resident manager involvement in
controlling drug-related crime and participation in community cleanup programs.

SSCPC lobbied legislative branches and
various agencies of the city government.
Its purpose was twofold: to obtain more
resources for the police and to further the
goals it shared with the police. Particular
efforts were directed to the strengthening
of State antidrug legislation that the police
had long desired. All the top commanders
in the Seattle police joined in the lobbying,
as did a number of city organizations.
Pressure was similarly applied to other
parts of the criminal justice system-to the
prosecutor's office to urge that drug traffickers be charged with the most serious
crime legally possible-and to other city
agencies to solve community public safety
problems such as poor lighting in the
parks.
This pressure showed that successful collaboration between SSCPC and the police
was taking place. The police reported the
problems that needed to be solved, and
SSCPC applied the pressure that brought
about action.

Spreading to other
parts of the city
SSCPC operated in only two of the three
"sectors" of one of the city's four police
precincts. But when quarterly crime statistics indicated the South Precinct was showing substantial improvement (see figure 3),
a loosely formed group in the East Precinct
(the Central Area and Capitol Hill) sought
guidance from SSCPC. The group obtained a grant to hire away an SSCPC
activist to work in the East Precinct. Bylaws, loosely patterned after those of
SSCPC, were used to establish the East
Precinct Crime Prevention Coalition.
Originally interested in a broad range of
social problems such as teen pregnancy,
housing, and substance abuse prevention,
the East Precinct decided by the end of
1988 to concentrate on criminal justice
issues. Rather than complain about problems and demand police action, the group

discovered it could play a positive role in
controlling crime.

crime prevention effort. The plan had
several provisions.

The West Precinct lies mainly in the downtown Seattle area encompassing the central
business district. It houses a host of social
service agencies, including release centers
for parolees, food and shelter missions for
street people, shelters for battered women,
alcohol and drug treatment centers, and
shelters for runaway or abandoned youth.

Crime Prevention Councils. The plan
authorized the city to allot $95,000 each
year to increase citizen involvement in
precinct work. This took the form of grants
to SSCPC and other crime prevention
councils to pay for recordkeeping, mailing
lists, board support, and other expenses.

It also has a growing number of luxury
condominiums; two popular tourist areas,
the Pike Place Market and Pioneer Square;
and a nationally known sports facility, the
Kingdome.
Downtown has a number of small business
groups such as the Pioneer Square Business Association and the Pike Place Market Association. There is also a large
umbrella organization, the Downtown
Seattle Association, that conducts some of
the most effective lobbying in the city,
typically in favor of police budgets.
The Pioneer Square Business Association
helped lead strong lobbying efforts for
better control of work release probationers;
enforcement of liquor laws, including
prohibition of open bottles in public; and
for foot and bicycle police patrols in
downtown areas where young people
congregate.

Citywide coordination
In spring 1989, the city and police department brought in a management consulting
firm to recommend improvements in public safety. The consultants recommended
the addition of 147 sworn and civilian
positions to the police department as well
as citywide expansion of the South Precinct partnership. This involved developing citizen-based advisory councils in all
precincts to play a strong role in advising
precinct commanders on community
affairs.
The city accepted the team's recommendations and incorporated them in a referendum, the Public Safety Action Plan, which
was placed before the voters in November
1989. It gained overwhelming approval
and furthered the joint interests of SSCPC
and the police by strengthening not only
the police but a number of community
organizations that were helping in the
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Police Department Advisory Councils.
Funds were also earmarked for the development of citizen-based councils that
would advise the precinct commanders on
community issues. Precinct commanders
would have input into the selection of
board members as well as agenda items.
Community-Police Teams. A key recommendation of the consultants' study that
was incorporated into the Public Safety
Action Plan was to introduce into each
precinct of the city a community policing
team composed of five officers and one
sergeant. The team would give full-time
attention to community policing and would
be specifically excluded from the responsibility of answering 911 calls. The purpose
of creating the specialty teams was to lock
the concept of community policing into
each precinct.
The East and South Precincts actually
implemented the team idea ahead of the
funding package. This served to test the
concept and identify potential problems,
such as the perception that the teams had
"soft" jobs and the need to develop special
training, operating procedures, and performance evaluation criteria for the officers on the teams. Close communication
and coordination within the department,
together with judicious selection of targets
appropriate to the specialized team approach, were deemed important in mitigating these problems.
Joint Parks Department and Police
Guild Program. Funds were allocated to a
program in which police union volunteers
would work with older youth in an evening
hour recreational program. The Police
Guild had been eager to work with the
Parks Department in developing such a
program.
Youth Intervention Program. The plan
called for a program to be jointly planned
by the police, the Department of Human
Resources, the schools, and community

Figure 3

Part 1 Offenses
Seattle Police Precincts: 1982-1989
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Serious crime rose throughout the city beginning in 1982 and 1983. The reverse in this trend that began in South Seattle in 1987 and in
other parts of the city in 1988 indicates the positive effects of SSCPC's and eventually other precincts' police-citizen partnership.
(The FBI's Part 1 offenses comprise the following serious crimes: murder, rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, larceny-theft, arson, and
motor vehicle theft.)

agencies. The program's purpose was to
prevent youth from getting involved in
gangs and to intervene with youth who
were already at high risk of involvement.

Lessons learned about
communities and police
Many definitions of community policing
exist, but they all have one element in
common: a cooperative approach to work-

ing with citizens and other agencies based
on the concept of shared responsibility for
community security.
Yet too often, the neighborhoods where
crime is worst and poses the greatest problems for police and citizens are precisely
the neighborhoods where police have had
few positive contacts with residents and no
experience of cooperation. Their relationship to citizens in these areas is more likely
to have been marked by distrust, confrontation, and hostility.
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Despite this, the Seattle experience indicates there is cause for optimism. Even
when the climate is at first confrontational,
police and citizens can still forge a positive
working partnership. But the partnership
must be built step by step. These are the
stages that communities can often expect
to go through:
Stage 1. This is the challenging/venting
stage, when citizens vociferously criticize
police methods and instances of abuse of
power or fault the police for doing "too

~tle, too late." The police, put on the
..1efense, can do little but explain their lack
of resources and power. Many of their
accusers may abandon the fray once they
have vented their anger.

Stage 2. At this organizational stage,
participants agree to "play ball." Community members start to attend meetings
regularly, ready to work on specific issues.
A stable relationship is developed within
which police and community can hammer
out a mutual agenda.
Stage 3. Now police and community,
having formed a stable relationship, commit to action. This is the success stage.
Actions are accomplished. Success breeds
not only more success but also a trusting
relationship. The group is even secure
enough to weather turnover and changes in
leadership.

Stage 4. In the final long-term stability
stage, the group can mount continuous
efforts to resolve problems as well as recruit wider community representation.

New roles for the community
.11 cities that have successfully implemented community policing methods,
citizens and citizen groups have fulfilled a
variety of roles to help police enforce the
law. In Seattle the community:

• Supported traditional police efforts by
helping select targets for police action.
• Sent a message to potential lawbreakers
that a neighborhood was off bounds, for instance by painting out graffiti with police
officers painting beside them.
• Served as the "eyes and ears" of the police by manning a hotline for receiving
crime information from citizens.
• Obtained legislative help for police by
lobbying and testifying on behalf of laws
and ordinances that would give police
forceful tools, especially to stop drug loitering on private property.
• Provided feedback to police on the success of their efforts by organizing dinners
and special events where officers and supervisors were thanked for work well
done. These special occasions provided the
~ormal vehicle for recognizing police that
.>frequently missing under traditional policing methods.

• Brought the need for adequate police
services to the'attention of the State legislature, the mayor, city council, and upper
echelons of city government. While this
activity has the potential for inducing
neighborhoods to compete with each other
for services, in Seattle police managers
were able to prioritize and allocate resources in a way that was fair to all groups.

Some conclusions
In addition to identifying the steps toward
fruitful cooperation, one can distill several
other lessons from the Seattle experience
in community policing:

Traditional policing and community
policing must remain partners.
Traditional police methods are not, as
many fear, incompatible with community
policing. Community policing is not just a
joint problem-solving process. It can also
involve arrest-oriented, get-tough solutions. The difference is that under community policing, the "tough" police action is
not a surprise to the law-abiding community. In fact, it may have been requested by
residents and citizens working with the
police. Seattle is having little difficulty
blending the traditional and communityoriented policing approach. CommunityPolice Teams work in tandem with regular
patrol to handle the full range of public
safety problems.

Some community policing programs
are natural.
A more livable neighborhood is good for
its own sake. The argument, for example,
that painting over graffiti and removing
abandoned cars should reduce crime is
intuitive to citizens in livable neighborhoods. Such activities unite the community
and send a message that residents care
about what happens to their neighborhoods
and are watching. It tells would-be lawbreakers that criminal activity will no
longer pass unnoticed. But in Seattle, it is
also clear that the removal of "bad actors"
from the neighborhoods is what most
encouraged the residents to act. Police
cleaned drug trafficking out of a park and
outlying streets. Reducing the criminal
element meant reducing fear of crime; it
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allowed neighborhood residents to reclaim
their parks and streets.

Community policing may create
turf problems.
Other public agencies are often surprised at
the amount of work created for them when
police become concerned with community
problems; some may not be able to respond as quickly as police and citizens
would like. For instance, some agencies
must follow a very slow and careful legal
process in dealing with such problems as
building code violations. A housing
agency does not want the police to dictate
its processes and priorities any more than
the police want to be managed by a
citizens league.
A related problem arises when it is clear
that a call by a business leader to the
mayor's office brings a faster agency response than one from the neighborhood
police officer. In Seattle this politicization
became a two-edged sword. On the one
hand, officers were in a position to mobilize some action by the community to
produce a response by the agency. On the
other hand, if the agency perceived that the
police played such a role, interagency
conflict resulted.
Community policing, and the workload it
implies for other agencies, suggest the
need for municipal leadership to mandate
some common interagency goals and chart
a new way for agencies to operate together.

New coordination links must
be created by police.
Community policing may involve conscripting the entire department into solving
broader community problems, or it may
focus on establishing specialized units,
freed from responding to 911 calls. One of
the problems with specialty units is that
they become isolated from other units and
from patrol.
Although it is often prudent to get the
programs going with specialized teams like
Seattle's Community-Police Teams, or by
initially testing the program in certain parts
of the city, the whole department needs to
be brought on board as local conditions
and constraints permit. In any event, community policing will require more coordination and enhanced information sharing

not only between police units, but ideally
within city government as a whole.

When implemented, community
policing may influence citizen calls
for service and neighborhood
crime levels.
Community policing tactics presume an
understanding that not all calls for service
require the immediate, ear-on-the-way
response of decades past. In the Seattle
South Precinct, however, calls for service
have actually increased since SSCPC
began, while declining in the rest of the
city. Although the number of serious
crimes declined throughout the city, the
decline was most dramatic in the South
Precinct areas where SSCPC was most
active.

Incorporating community policing
into a department's operational
structure may require sensitivity to
issues ofpolice accountability.
Community policing holds that neighborhood officers should be able to use their
judgment in taking whatever action is
necessary to solve a problem. These elements, however, may create concerns
about the appearance of corruption, excessive force, and "letting the officer own too
much of his beat."
Typically, modem policing employs rotation of assignment (among other tactics) to
prevent such abuses. Arbitrary rotation,
however, is antithetical to the idea of community policing. Under this style of policing, an officer is encouraged to get to
know the community, become aware of a
neighborhood's dynamics, and develop
open lines of communication. All of this
takes time and would be undermined by
the normal police rotation cycle.
Another important aspect of community
policing-target selection-need not create the risk of payoffs or corruption that
some critics might predict. In Seattle officers were dealing with an organized group
of neighborhood citizens rather than with
individuals in defining issues to be addressed and targets to be selected.

Community policing duties require
officer skills different from those
used in traditional policing.
Officers using community policing strategies need to think independently and creatively. They must be able to develop
appropriate steps for solving problems.
Seattle's lesson is that departments implementing community policing techniques
must modify their recruitment, selection,
and training programs to develop a core of
officers with the initiative and instinct for
working with the community and with
government agencies. A first step for police departments is to develop standards for
recruiting, training, and evaluating staff
assigned to community policing duties.

A successful citizen-police partnership
expands its goals and membership
to include broad segments of the
community.
While at first the partnership may address
only a selected group of issues that are of
concern to a limited number of residents,
the success of the police-community partnership requires an expansion of both its
goals and participants. This is clearly the
course taken in Seattle, where SSCPC and
the police found that many resources they
needed to solve their local problems rested
with the State legislature, the city council,
or public and private agencies. In reaching
out to these entities and to the diverse
elements within their own community,
SSCPC and the police not only achieved
their initial goals but also were able to see
them eventually adopted citywide.
Having identified the lessons learned in
Seattle, NIJ' s reporting team offered 17
community-police program recommendations and 14 recommendations for research. A partial list follows.

Program recommendations
• Strongly consider the community policing approach in all police agencies and jurisdictions. This is in keeping with present
NIJ theory and policy, which holds that in
recent years discussion of the rhetoric of
community policing has slowed its actual
implementation, and that developing and
implementing successful community policing models should take immediate priority.
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e Establish the partnership nature of tht
community-police relationship in the early
stages.

e

Develop clear and reasonable goals and
time schedules; pushing too fast involves a
large degree of risk.

e

Secure the commitment of city and
elected officials at an early stage.

• Develop programs (and communications mechanisms) with other city departments and service delivery groups.
• Begin with an evaluation plan.

Research recommendations
• Update and extend research on the relationship between decay, physical disorder,
fear, and crime.
• Study the financial impact on police
and cities of the community-oriented
approach.
• Explore whether and how communityoriented programs may displace crime
(move it from one neighborhood to
another).
• Review the coordination needed between police and other departments in order to enhance this process.

Evolution of a true
partnership
The Seattle experience offered no new
answers to the frequent definitional demand, "What is community policing?" It
has, however, underscored the need for
police and citizens to share responsibility
for community security and has emphasized the usefulness of target selection and
a problem-solving focus. Usually, ad hoc
neighborhood groups organize around
specific problems, but interest fades when
the problem appears solved. In Seattle, the
community and police continued their
partnership.
In 1987, when the SSCPC revolution was
growing rapidly, a new police captain took
command in the South Precinct. He soon
met with SSCPC and established his dedication to its principles.
When potential investigators asked him
about crime, he pointed out that crime in
the South Precinct was decreasing and

,ng confined to smaller areas. A newsphoto showed him brush in hand, in civilian work clothes, at a graffiti paintout. He
repeatedly pointed out that he was raised in
South Seattle and still lived there. Best of
all, he told SSCPC:
In essence, what you are doing here is
asking [the police] to do what I used to
do as a young officer 20 years ago.
You're asking us to come out to the
neighborhoods and get to know the
people.

police work, the partnership is continually
reinforced.
• SSCPC's evolution from a committee of
the Rainier Chamber of Commerce to a
working partner with the police has involved many discussions and decisions
about each side's responsibilities for
achieving common goals. At each juncture,
decisions have been jointly taken and formalized. These form the foundation for a
workable collaboration between the police
and citizens.

Even more than this, the Seattle experience
can provide useful guidance and serve as a
model for other communities that are interested in developing meaningful partnerships involving citizens and the police.
Several elements in the SSCPC-police
partnership experience in Seattle are particularly noteworthy:

• Over time the partn rship has developed
into an eftecliv means of increasing community security by expanding its focus to
encompass a range of issues that affect the
quality of neighborhood life. It has demonstrated that crime prevention, broadly delined, benefits from the joint atl'enlion of
police and community.

• The partnership has enabled the community and the police to work together on
a day-to-day basis in the joint task of controlling crime and increasing public security. Together, citizens and police define
the problems, select the targets to be ad~ssed, and in many cases share in develt-'ing the strategies to deal with them. In
short, the basis for the partnership is a
sense of shared responsibility for community security.

The seeds of the partnershi p between police
and citizens were sown 5 years ago in the
Rainier Valley section of Seattle. In the
short time since then the partnership has
spread to the entire city. The citizens of
Seattle have endorsed the partnership's
goal in a referendum and committed public funds to a tronger safer community.
The Seattle experience offe1 ::1 u eful
model of strategies for other cities to study
and make their own.

• The partnership has provided benefits
for both parties that sustain and reinforce
the relationship between the police and
the community. When citizens feel more
safe and secure, and when police experience the support of citizens who lobby for
better legislation and more resources for
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